The Dangerous Shift: How the Assisted Dying Bill Introduces a Novel and Risky Framework
How a Quiet Amendment in the Assisted Dying Bill Could Turn Life-and-Death Decisions into a Financially Incentivised Industry
The Dangerous Shift: How the Assisted Dying Bill Introduces a Novel and Risky Framework
The Assisted Dying Bill currently under consideration in Parliament contains a deeply concerning provision that risks fundamentally altering the landscape of end-of-life care in the UK. One of the most alarming aspects of this bill is the introduction of pensions for panel members who would replace High Court judges in approving assisted suicide requests. This seemingly innocuous change carries profound ethical and practical implications that diverge sharply from international standards and sets a dangerous precedent that no other jurisdiction has dared to consider.
From Judicial Oversight to Paid Panels: A Radical Departure
Historically, decisions regarding assisted dying have been subject to strict legal scrutiny, typically overseen by judges or senior legal professionals to ensure impartiality and adherence to strict safeguards. The UK's proposed shift from judicial oversight to panels of paid 'experts' is unprecedented. These panel members would not only receive remuneration and allowances but also pensions—a long-term financial incentive structure that risks compromising the integrity of these life-and-death decisions.
Why Pensions Change Everything
The introduction of pensions moves these panels from a temporary, case-by-case oversight mechanism to a permanent institution embedded within the healthcare and legal framework. This shift has several dangerous implications:
Institutional Normalisation of Assisted Suicide: By granting pensions, the bill suggests that these panels are here to stay. Assisted dying is no longer a carefully considered legal exception but a routine aspect of healthcare administration. This normalisation risks desensitising decision-makers to the gravity of their decisions, potentially leading to more approvals over time.
Financial Incentivisation of Approvals: Pensions create a structural bias. Panel members would have a vested interest in the system's longevity, potentially influencing decisions in favour of assisted suicide approvals to justify the existence and funding of their roles. This is not speculation; human nature and institutional dynamics show that financial incentives can subtly yet powerfully shape decision-making.
Erosion of Public Trust: The public's confidence in end-of-life decisions depends on their perception of fairness, impartiality, and compassion. Introducing pensions into the process risks shattering that trust. Families and vulnerable individuals may question whether decisions were made based on genuine need or influenced by panel members' financial interests.
International Comparisons: A Stark Contrast
Globally, jurisdictions that have legalised assisted dying have taken great care to maintain impartiality and public trust. In Canada, for example, decisions are overseen by independent medical professionals without long-term financial incentives tied to the approval process. The Netherlands and Belgium, despite having liberal euthanasia laws, rely on independent regional committees that review decisions post-factum rather than pre-approving cases. None of these countries have introduced pensions or long-term financial rewards for those involved in the process.
The UK's proposed system is, therefore, a dangerous outlier. By institutionalising panels through pensions, it risks creating a self-perpetuating industry around assisted dying—a step that even countries with decades of experience in euthanasia legislation have not taken.
The Ethical Dilemma: Cost-Cutting Disguised as Compassion?
Critics argue that this clause could open the door to decisions driven more by economic considerations than patient welfare. As healthcare budgets face increasing strain, there is a real risk that the assisted dying process becomes a cost-saving mechanism. After all, end-of-life care is expensive; assisted dying, comparatively, is not. The inclusion of pensions for panel members could subtly align their interests with broader institutional goals to reduce long-term care costs.
A Call to Action
The introduction of pensions for assisted dying panel members represents a radical and untested approach with potentially catastrophic consequences. No other nation has ventured down this path, and for good reason. The gravity of deciding whether someone should live or die requires the highest possible standards of impartiality—standards best upheld by the judiciary, not incentivised panels.
This clause was introduced during the committee stage as an amendment, following significant concerns about the committee's biased setup in favour of the bill. The timing appears suspicious, potentially designed to avoid further scrutiny and changes. The UK should not become the first country to monetise and institutionalise assisted suicide panels—better yet, it should abandon this bill entirely. The sanctity of life, the integrity of the legal system, and the trust of the public depend on it.